Why tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are rising again

Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are nothing new. Between 1998 and 2000, the two countries fought a devastating war, sparked by disputes over the border town of Badme, that is estimated to have killed up to 100,000 people. While that war formally ended with the Algiers Agreement in December 2000, it was followed by almost two decades of a cold war: closed borders, frozen relations and deep mistrust on both sides.

Upon coming to power in 2018, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a peace agreement with Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki which formally ended the state of war and for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. However, mistrust remained close to the surface.

In 2020 war broke out in Tigray between forces aligned with the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). During this conflict, Eritrea fought alongside the Ethiopian government, seeing the TPLF as a common enemy which had sparked the previous "border war". While Abiy has publicly thanked Eritrea for this, since the end of the war in 2022 both countries have been suspicious of each other's ambitions in this region, which directly borders Eritrea.

Port ambitions

However, amid this complicated backdrop, the most recent tensions have surrounded Abiy's stated mission to secure Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea, which he sees as vital for "determining" Ethiopia's economic development and national security.

The world's most populous landlocked nation, Ethiopia lost access to the Red Sea port of Assab when Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, something Abiy has referred to as a "mistake" that should be "corrected". At a military parade in early March Ethiopian soldiers marched with a flag stating in Amharic: "whether they like it or not, we will not be landlocked."

With tensions continuing to rise, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have amassed troops on their shared border, leading analysts to fear that war could be on its way. Martin Plaut, senior research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London, tells African Business that the tensions are acute.

"It is interesting that the Ethiopian National Defence Force has moved so much of its equipment, heavy artillery, tanks and personnel up to the north [in Tigray] because this is a massive mobilisation," he says.

"They cannot sustain this for very long because they could leave themselves open to attack from the Oromo and Amhara forces who are already fighting them in different areas. They have a limited time frame: they cannot just sit there and wait for something to happen."

While acknowledging that conflict remains very much a possibility, Plaut believes on balance that Abiy will decide not to pursue a war.

"Crossing into Eritrea would be a whole new ball game, because there is no pretext to do it," he argues. "To do that, they would have to violate the borders of a nation officially recognised by the United Nations."

Enter Saud

Plaut also speculates that, should Ethiopia decide to move into Eritrea, it could face an attack from Saudi Arabian forces in the air. Riyadh has aligned with Eritrea, partly as a reaction to the growing influence of the United Arab Emirates in Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa.

While the recent outbreak of war in Iran and Tehran's attacks on the Gulf states mean Riyadh will now potentially need to retain capabilities closer to home, the prospect of coming into contact with Saudi forces in Eritrea could yet deter Abiy from a full-blown invasion.

However, Corrado Cok, visiting research fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, points out that the war in Iran also complicates the picture for Ethiopia.

"There is a risk that, due to the tensions in the Gulf, there is going to be less pressure on Abiy from powers in the Middle East and global powers like the US," Cok says.

"But one factor that should be taken into account is that the Iran war could send oil prices higher. This makes a military operation more costly and complicated."

David Shinn, a former US ambassador to Ethiopia, is sceptical that a conflict between Addis Ababa and Asmara will break out.

"The idea that Ethiopia is going to get access to the Red Sea militarily is wishful thinking," he tells African Business.

"Trying to hold a corridor [through Eritrea] on to the sea and a port is just not that probable.

"It is possible that Abiy might be able to negotiate something along those lines, but it is not going to happen as a result of military effort."

Tigray trigger

A more likely scenario, Shinn believes, is a renewed flare up of tensions with the TPLF in Tigray - although he does "worry that things could get out of hand" and potentially draw in other actors.

Plaut also notes that "a more limited war with Tigray" is possible but would also be an unappealing prospect. The Tigrayans have shown that they can fight for years by retreating into the hills and mountains of Tigray and they are exceptionally good at guerilla warfare," he says.

The Tigray war - which is estimated to have claimed up to 600,000 lives and displaced 3m people - was financially devastating for Ethiopia. The conflict destroyed swathes of factories and industries in the Tigray region and cost Ethiopia approximately $20m each month in export revenues.

This contributed to a widening current account deficit, dwindling foreign exchange reserves, and pushed Addis Ababa into defaulting on its international debt.

Since then, Ethiopia's economic prospects have been on the up, with the cessation of hostilities in Tigray and a package of financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank helping to stabilise the macroeconomic situation.

With Abiy continuing to pursue a broad policy of economic liberalisation - such as freely floating the Ethiopian birr and opening up protected industries to foreign competition - GDP growth is expected to surpass 10% in the 2025/26 fiscal year.

An outbreak of fresh conflict in Tigray or Eritrea would likely undermine this growth - not just in Ethiopia, but potentially across the Horn of Africa.

Conflict cluster

Cok suggests that, because of Eritrea's backing of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in neighbouring Sudan, as well as the ongoing civil war in South Sudan, any conflict could easily spread.

"We could see a "conflict cluster" where different actors align against their respective rivals and the conflict ends up expanding further across the region," he says.

"Ethiopia knows that a war with Eritrea would pretty much put an end to foreign investment, at least in the short term," Shinn tells African Business.

"Even the discussion of it, which is fairly rampant now, has got to have a negative impact on any potential investor thinking of going into Ethiopia or anywhere else in the region for that matter."

"Obviously war is not great for business or business confidence," Plaut similarly notes. "Ethiopia has had fantastic growth rates in recent years and has done very well. Do they really want to put that in jeopardy?"